The Impending Chaos:
A Conflict of Culture
by Bob Hoernel

For the past two hundred and fifty years politics, and political ideas, have dominated the process of cultural change throughout the world. This essay seeks to consider the significance of recent events in relation to a significant shift in the prime locus of cultural faith and values away from what are essentially political and humanist visions toward more ethereal and ethical concerns. For the most part we are unaware of this shift, as political expressions have tended to become more sacred, and religious institutions become more political; yet as the prospect of a singular and all powerful mass culture appears uncomfortably close to consolidating social and political power throughout the world, we witness both increasing opposition to it, and increased regional competition for control of it.

This is my premise, and the perspective from which I intend to view recent events and the current crisis. Although there may well have been a belief that 'God is on our side' during the world wars of the twentieth century, these conflicts were fought over differing ideological and political preferences, and competing political and economic power relations between quite recently established modern nation states. While the icons and symbols of these powers may well have been venerated and worshiped, the wars themselves were only distantly related to religious structures or expressions. To appreciate something of the significance of this shifting cultural tide, I would simply point to the frequency of references to 'God' in the current conflicts (and by contending interests or their media). Although we may prefer to characterize conflict between certain groups as a function of historical hatreds (especially in the Middle East), it is obvious that they are expressions of a far more immediate and fundamental nature.
 
 

It is both simplistic and inaccurate to state that most citizens of Islamic states hate North Americans because they support Israel and Zionism. While examples of such support have served to enrage passions, it is not the root cause of their enmity. We are often given the impression that there is a long historical tradition of conflict between Jews and Muslims; in fact, that history is not as long as is generally believed . . . it began with the United Nations plan of 1947 to partition British Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. It is not even as old as I am. I do not imply that all Semitic peoples existed in harmony before that date, but relations between Jews and Arabs were no more strained than those between Kurds and Turks, or Arabs and Turks. During the period of the Caliphate, when Islamic power and civilization was at its height, Jews were better treated in the Islamic world, than they were in most of Christian Europe. Zionism is the focus of much Islamic outrage, but the main cause of conflict is neither racial nor religious; it (and the threat to Islam) is cultural. What most threatens the nations of Islam is a process of rapid cultural change and homogenization.

This is not a potential threat, but an actual process. Furthermore, this process of rapid culture change is not exclusively a concern in the middle east; it is also a concern in Asia and Europe. Indeed, although the United States is often vilified as the source of this 'cultural imperialism,' the effects of culture change have been as rapid (and almost as extensive) in the Americas as in other areas. Although such change is intrinsic and extensive, it is often incremental and difficult to perceive. Yet many Americans feel nearly as threatened by change and its pace (technological, political and cultural) as do members of more 'traditional' societies. Europeans, although convinced that they are more 'civilized' than Americans, are no less responsible . . . yet considerably more pragmatic and obtuse in their policies.

It is widely perceived in much of the world (but particularly in Europe) that the greatest threat to world peace, and the capacity of a united Europe to challenge American hegemony in finance and international policy, is the continued existence of the Israeli state. In other words, at least three members of the United Nations Security Council (and many more U.N. member states) would gladly sacrifice the nation that they brought into existence in 1948, if by doing so they secured good political and economic relations with the majority of Islamic states. Two events greatly altered the structure of world finance and power in the past three years: the American election of 2000; and the terrorist attacks of September, 2001 . . . they brought about a complete reversal of advantage, and those interests that had been on the offensive have been forced onto the defensive.

In fact, the 'hegemony' of the United States is non-existent. This is not conjecture or a statement based upon some screw-ball conspiracy theory; politics and media in the U.S. is largely influenced (if not directly controlled) by huge financial interests. These interests fall into two competing streams of finance capital. This has happened before; it was characteristic of the period in American business history known as 'The Gilded Age' or the 'Great Merger Movement' at the beginning of the last century (and can be fully documented). It, and the politics of oil, were central to the causes of the Mexican Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the First World War. Ordinarily these competing interests manage to find ways to defuse and disguise the effects of their intrigue when it appears that it has gone too far (and war or economic chaos threatens); when, however, it appears that the dominant group seeks not only to defeat, but to destroy its opponent, such conflict and its effects cannot be contained (and knowledge of it kept from a wider group of people). The media war between the Pulitzer and Hurst empires was a reflection of such a time, and can be compared to the Murdoch and Turner empires of today. Few perhaps realize how much hung upon Florida ballots in November of 2000 . . . or upon the battle for 'hearts and minds' in the period leading up to September of 2001. The stakes were enormous, and the competition became a battle for survival. Its effects cannot now be contained, however the battleground has shifted. If America is now viewed as the enemy, it is a very different America (and a very different world).

In the immediate future, the shifting strengths of these competing interests can be measured by the relative value of the Euro and the U.S. Dollar . . . and by the degree to which the Euro begins to replace the dollar as the world's reserve currency. But I have strayed from my theme of culture change, and that is the theme which will prove most determinant in the long run.

In politics, as well as in business, there occur periods of amalgamation followed by periods of particularism (and vice versa). This happens on distinct scales, and varies from region to region, but such trends are universally observable. In recent years there has developed a situation wherein states and corporations appear to allow a concurrent increase in both. This would seem contradictory and impossible, however in the current climate we witness both an extensive amalgamation of interests and power which permits a relative autonomy and extended identities for particular groups within such structures. These particular groups remain dependent upon the larger corpus, and (while less than sovereign entities) they enjoy a sense and an image of self that is distinct and particular from that body which both permits and limits their relative sovereignty. What emerges is a condition wherein a Catalunia can emerge as an autonomous identity unrelated to Spain, but both are mutually dependent upon the larger corpus of power (that diminishes and regulates the sovereignty of both Spanish and Catalan interests). This has allowed for an extension of particularism with regard to effective autonomy, accompanied by a consolidation of control and dependencies (effectively reducing sovereignty). This process has even served to diminish the sovereignty of the what are considered the premiere world powers (as Eugene McCarthy has written). It relates directly to media influence and cultural change, whilst it renders the use of national labels hazardous.

My suggestion is that there exist two amorphous centers of financial and military power which extend their influence over what appear to be sovereign states with actual borders; and that these dependencies and allegiances are subject to shifts . . . in the same manner that the relationships between commercial entities and centers of finance capital (upon which they are dependent) are subject to change. Although there may exist specific differences in the corporate culture of these two centers of power (and somewhat distinct policy objectives), their objectives are really not very different . . . except with regard to where and to whom the benefits will flow. Although policy approaches and statements appear somewhat more red or blue, the final objectives are almost identical. Which is which has been very difficult to diagram (and almost as difficult to name). They cut across the boundaries of political parties, and even boardrooms and cabinets. This difficulty has been much reduced in recent months, as direct conflict brings flotsam to the surface.

It is obvious that not all the world is subject to these dependencies, and degree of dependence varies. There remain certain states that either play one group against the other, or have not committed to dependencies or support. This has become increasingly difficult in the past couple of years (and particularly in the past few months). I want to speak particularly here with regard to Islamic countries and oil producing states.

The cultural threat to Islamic countries is greater than it is to other societies, traditional or otherwise. Consider the magnitude and speed of culture change in a country such as Malaysia; it has been rapid and all-pervasive, transforming city and countryside in a decade or two. Economic development and (what used to be called) progress during the period of the Cold War were generally considered 'good,' and much of what was then considered 'the third world' sought to modernize with the assistance of both 'first' and 'second' world powers. It is significant that most of the pressure to assist such development, and extend foreign aid, did not come from that financial combination that is now most associated with the United States; it came from the more multinational group, which is now more dominant in the European Union. Much has changed in the period since the Berlin Wall fell, and not least of this has to do with assisting or encouraging such development (and the desire to experience it). From an economic point of view, it was assumed that modernization of many African, Asian, and Latin American economies would greatly expand world markets (and permit rapid economic growth of the world economy). Much of this growth did take place, and hundreds of billions were invested, but it soon became apparent that most newly developed economies produced considerably more than they consumed. This factor, to a far greater degree than cultural opposition to such change, served to diminish the push for modernization and to increase competition and conflict between, not so much the 'haves and 'have nots,' but the two main groupings of finance capital. In that competition and conflict, and the pressing need to expand established markets, lies the basis for a vast expansion of credit on all levels.1 This history is most complex and variegated, however it is clear that its effects have caused economic contortions and threatened stability; it is also clear that it has caused a 'conservative' cultural backlash.

The issue of modernization in Turkey today is vastly different from the conditions considered by Mustafa Kemal during the period leading up to the Great War. I would add that this apparently conservative backlash is also observable in the United States (particularly outside the major metropolitan centers). It is not so much that these peoples are wanting to return to earlier forms and conditions, as it is that it is no longer so popular to be 'progressive.' In Islamic populations (and, parenthetically, in rural societies in general) the response is more clearly a desire to either conserve what remains of traditional values, or to return to older and more traditional ones.

Russia, and the former states of the Soviet Union, are particularly split on the issue of forms and values . . . as well as with regard to where they might place their allegiances and establish their dependencies. Their Islamic populations and petroleum reserves, when coupled with geographic considerations serve to suggest their interests are better served by close ties with Europe and the Balkins. Although this is also highly complex, the stretegic importance of the Balkins is at least as great as it was in 1914 (and very much related to oil and to Islam).

Although some readers may be interested in this thesis of corporate conflict as it relates to world events and national politics, and others may reject it out of hand, what I want to express in this essay does not hinge upon the validity of this interpretation. It has been expressed mainly with regard to our capacity to comprehend what is behind shifts in policy, and to emphasize my premise that the consolidation and internationalization of power is a matter of concern for all nations . . . and that policies which have a profound social and cultural effect are not uniformly threatening from one society to another. I do not feel obliged to support this thesis further, however I have developed it more fully with reference to the period of 1898 - 1914 (See: Robert B. Hoernel, Las grandes corporaciones y la política del gran garrote en Cuba y en México, Historia Mexicana, XXX (3), October - December, 1980, pp. 209 - 245).

My assertion that Islamic societies are particularly threatened (and have themselves long been aware of this threat) should by no means be interpreted as reflective of an incompatability between Islam and other faiths; these societies are particularly threatened by modernism, and its underlying assumptions. To one degree or another, all religions share this concern, yet most have been able to work out some sort of modus vivendi with modernism and the modern nation states. This has proven to be a strained relationship, however it is particularly so in predominantly Muslim countries. In fact, I entertain a considerable sympathy for their position (and recognize the basis of their concerns). About the worst possible manifestation of these tensions and their attendent conflicts would be one characterized by popular perceptions of religious war. This would be particularly unfortunate, as religious leaders and organizations are notably absent from the conflicting power elites that are most responsible for the current environment. Islam, and the history of Islam, to a greater degree than other faiths, has within it an awareness of the ease with which secular interests and activities can subvert its essential character; as Ibn Kaldûn expresed it, " . . . bits of shell get mixed with the nut."

I am fully aware that culture, like language, is a growing and changing thing. The concerns expressed by clerics of many faiths do not reflect a desire to 'freeze' cultures, and prevent such alterations; they are expressive of a full scale assault upon the very foundations of these beliefs, and of numerous societies. On the other hand, neither would I suggest that there do not remain certain differences within what is generally described as 'western modern society.' Europeans would consider themselves considerably more cerebral and cosmopolitan than their North American cousins, who would likely agree that they are more emotional and lean upon less intellectual references. There are also significant social and cultural differences within Europe, but European resentment toward American mass culture (as symbolized by Coke, McDonalds and Disney) is a response to the crass and unrefined aspect of such influence . . . not to the humanist assumptions upon which modernism is supported.

It would be a mistake to characterize conflicting interests in relation to geographic or national identies, as these interests and their supporters are not neatly arranged within distinct spheres; both Europeans and North Americans (and corporations) are divided with regard to their politics and allegiances. As conflict (financial and military) erupts, however, there is a definite move toward economic nationalism (and increased stretegic concerns) in both spheres. This tends to galvanize predominant attitudes within particular countries and geographic areas, such that the characterization becomes more accurate. Much of this neo-nationalism is a function of renewed concern for access to markets and raw materials . . . and particularly to petroleum reserves. It expresses both economic and stretegic necessities, and fixes attention upon oil producing states, and (to an alarming degree) replicates conditions prior to the last world war.

The three cornered fight between the Rockefellers, Rothchilds, and Nobels for control of Russia's petroleum production and distribution prior to the First World War was a major contributing factor to the Russian Revolution and volitility in the Balkin states. In the current environment, Russia could well be expected to secure its access to Caspian and Azerbaijani oilfields. Similarly, Europe, Japan, China, and North America would seek to secure present sources, and extend exploration in their respective spheres. The present conflict in Iraq is not unrelated to this consideration, but is more directly related to maintaining the current practice of pricing Arabian crude oil in U.S. dollars (rather than Euros). The same concern was a factor in Venezuela. Its immediate effect is to galvanize geographic attitudes and hasten the move to nationalist economics in both Europe and the United States. This puts Great Britain in a very unenviable situation, as it considers abandoning Sterling for the Euro.

The cultural concern, expressed by many clerics, reflects an inherent incompatibility between consumption driven societies based upon what must be seen as pragmatic assumptions and objectives, and more traditional social foundations based upon more historic values and less utilitarian ends; it is not a new concern, and is not confined to what are termed fundamentalists, or to Islam. Moderns are determined to build the celestial city right here on earth, while they contend for advantage and support in determining how it is engineered and governed; clerics, and especially Islamic clerics, see this as highly arrogant, unholy, decadent, and downright evil. All those opposed to the modernist plans are not radical 'fundamentalists,' and neither are they entirely Islamic. They are better viewed as non-believers in the modern myth, who have more faith in tradition than they do in the miracles of science and technology.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the more recent invasion of that same country reflect very similar concerns and causes (on the part of very distinct modern states). The task of building a modern state in Afghanistan (or even in Iraq) is rendered almost impossible due to these same (essentially) cultural concerns; while that of governing such a state is necessarily dependent upon some degree of repression.

What most troubles me is that I cannot see any way to solve these problems, or to remove these anxieties. While there may be means by which tensions might be reduced, this can only be accomplished if cool heads prevail; it cannot be resolved by concessions . . . neither religious nor secular, and not even by the elimination of Zionism. My great fear is that passions on all sides already serve to silence cool heads, or render words of wisdom undetectable. My other fear is that conflict between modern interest groups has already gone beyond a potential for resolution, and that the effects of past conflict (and its resultant economic effects) has brought the world economy to a point of a credit implosion. In other words, that severe economic depression is now considered likely (and all that can be done is to redirect the blame). If so, then the west is also in for an extensive and rapid change in its culture . . . and a loss of its most valued freedoms. The following is offered not as prediction, but in the hope that, if people are more aware of the critical nature of this crisis, we may yet be able to avoid the storm that is upon us.

Those who are most threatened by modern states have very little military capacity to confront their enemies. The only means by which they could achieve their ends would be to create a situation wherein conflicting interests within the modern world would be drawn into conflict between themselves. These modern interests are not easily defined on the basis of nationality, however they are increasingly representative of Central Europe and North America. Russia, Japan, China, and much of the remaining world would be drawn into such a conflict; be it economic or military. The current battle for hearts and minds is largely directed at these populations. Of them Russia, China and Japan are most critical.

The most direct cause of any future conflict between Europe and the United States would relate to economic chaos in one or both areas. Such monetary and fiscal collapse or strife is to be avoided at all cost (if it is not already inevitable), and the capacity to remove or defer that specter is very much dependent upon the cost and availability of crude oil to both spheres. It is this factor that has driven the invasion of Iraq, and it is intended to effect neighboring producers as much as to secure Iraqi deposits. Politicians and financiers have a moral duty (as humanists or as traditionalists) to do all within their power to avoid such extreme distress. Should conflicting financial groups fail to work together toward this end, the situation will quickly deteriorate (and become both chaotic and unstopable).

I have long held that there are no winners in war, but one side typically looses more than the other; in this case everyone loses in far greater measure. Neither am I particularly interested in pointing a finger of blame, as I can appreciate the dilemma of all groups; the greatest weight of responsibility, however, falls upon those leaders who now have the capacity and duty to step forward and act responsibly . . . should they fail to, they are to blame (those on all three sides). This is particularly the case with regard to those who are in power, but also of those who are influential. If ever there was a time for religious leaders to come together, and to speak clear words in a loud voice, it is now. Much of the world has lost faith in politicians, in political institutions, and in media mush. Should they fail to come forward, or speak only to their own, then we are indeed bankrupt and decadent. I want to express a few thoughts on prophesy and fate.

As an historian I do feel that there exists a certain inevitability about the way events unfold. Fate is not equivalent to a predestined future, but more akin to the effect of our continuing to 'see' and react in a particular context and mode. What I am suggesting is that unless we -- all of us -- can begin to 'read' and to comprehend in a distinct mode of thought, and context of significance, we will continue attempting to defeat that which defines us. Either we will manage that capacity, or we will inevitably come to see ourselves in the image of our enemy . . . if indeed we are able to see at all. In other words, my suggestion is that we tend to climb up and down the same trees . . . it is like deja vu (all over again).  I do not believe that I am overstating the gravity of our current condition, yet would dearly appreciate the words of all who might relieve these anxioties.

To those who express their opposition to the current conflict (and any that may follow), I urge you to consider all factors and actions that have brought the crisis to this extreme . . . and to be mindful that you demonstrate in an environment radically distinct from that of the 1970's. It is far more dangerous today, and considerably less likely to produce the desired results. This essay is my best effort in that regard, and is not intended to influence either popular attitudes or political interests . . . it is an attempt to show just how out of hand conditions have gotten, and a plea to all those in positions of power or influence to act quickly and decisively now . . . before all hope of some accommodation is futile. The people must be informed of what is happening and why, they may just prove to be more comprehending than their leaders have demonstrated themselves to be. I emphasize, if permitted to continue there will be no winners . . . not even those peoples who remain unaligned. The predictable result could only be devastation of all that we value and worship (no matter where our faith might reside).

Although there is no way to avoid hard times ahead, and a considerable change in the quality and way of life, it is not too late to avoid a completely insane destruction of all that the conflicting groups hold dearest (and their posterity). This condition and environment is not solely the fault of Islamic extremists, any more or less than it is the fault of modern corporate leaders. Such conflict is only possible when opposing interests perceive that their opposition either seeks to destroy them, or progressively erode them. I do not know that the Islamic world could now accept western assurances on good faith, but I do know that modern power groups are capable of working together to avoid their mutual destruction. The task is to convince these leaders to cease fanning emotional flames and to end their folly . . . in effect, to impress upon them the nature and extent of the conflict between them. From that awareness, we can begin to address the fallout of their earlier imprudence, and deal with the great challenges we all face and are all responsible for. Alternatively, they will be acting out their own most horrific fundamentalist prophesy.

Yours sincerely,

Bob Hoernel (8 April, 2003)

Insert: 23 September, 2008 {The imprudent expansion of credit was only made possible by the assumption of continued expansion of world economies: it feeds on new capitol from new growth (and further credit). I am amazed that it managed to continue as long as it has, however when the cost of carbon fuels began to increase at a rate greater than personal income the hand writing was on the wall.}
P.S. This essay was originally intended as part of a series of essays on a considerably wider (and less immediate) topic. It has been changed in the past weeks from a more general treatment, to a more immediate plea for wisdom and prudence.

You are welcome to browse an earlier essay written in January of 2000. To access this work: